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У статті з’ясовано, що структура розвідувальної референтури УВО 
складалася з трьох груп: військової, територіальної та закордонної. Військова 
мережа поділялася на корпусні «експозитури», дивізійні, полкові та батальйонні 
«розвідчі станиці». Територіальна – на обласні «експозитури», окружні та пові-
тові «розвідувальні станиці». Закордонна – складалася з Розвідувальних бюро, які 
підпорядковувалися Центральному розвідчому бюро. 
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Currently, Ukrainian society is experiencing a new powerful wave of national 
revival. The determined search for an alternative to the Soviet heritage of our history 
continues. The need for radical state bodies reform, including the intelligence service, 
boosts a demand for utilization of successful achievements of the Ukrainian liberation 
movement. In the context of this recent tendency, an investigation of the Ukrainian 
Military Organization intelligence subdivision (hereinafter – UVO) activity is becoming 
relevant. 
By analyzing the latest publications on the mentioned topic, we can distinguish 
works of Dmytro Vedeneev, Petro Mirchuk, Olexandr Kucheruk and Mykola Posivnych 
[1–3; 27; 25, 26; 23; 24; 28]. Nevertheless, those works only scarcely cover the subject of 
our study. 
The research is devoted solely to the UVO intelligence subdivision and based 
on the documents which have been revealed for the first time from the State Central 
Archive in Prague for the scientific usage. The study allows to fill a significant gap in the 
history of the special services of the Ukrainian liberation movement. 
The purpose of the article is to accomplish a comprehensive investigation of the 
structure, development stages, activity tendencies of the UVO intelligence unit and 
their connections with the special services of Lithuania and Germany.
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The origin of the UVO intelligence services had its roots in the officers’ experience 
of the Ukrainian Galician Army (hereinafter – UGA), which was gained during the 
battles of the First World War and the liberation struggles of 1918–1921. 
Yaroslav Chyzh (“Yaroslav Kutko”), a former chief of the intelligence department of 
the Sich Riflemen Corps, was the first, in the spring of 1921, who headed the Intelligence 
subdivision (hereinafter – R-R) of the UVO leadership team [26, 710, 841]. He was 
shortly replaced by a former UGA centurion, Mykhailo Koltuniuk, and in the spring 
of 1922, Osyp Dumin (“Sulyma”), a former regiment commander of the Sich Riflemen, 
occupied the R-R UVO head position [3, 97]. The day before, Osyp Dumin worked as a 
tactics teacher at the Kyiv school of the red officers and miraculously escaped an arrest 
by the provincial Chk [4, 16–18]. 
It was when “Sulyma” occupied a chief post, that the UVO intelligence acquired 
its full status [27, 242]. An UVO combat head officer of the Kraiowa (regional) team, 
Zynoviy Knysh (“Rens”) recalled that Osyp Dumin was “a capable and energetic 
person, strong and individual on each side” [2, 59]. At the same time, he disseminated 
communist ideas in the UVO environment.  He had been inciting Yevgen Petrushevych 
to oppose Yevhen Konovalets, by using personal ambitions of the former president of 
the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (hereinafter – ZUNR). Eventually, together 
with a Kraiowyi UVO commander, Yaroslav Indyshevskyi, they succeeded in making 
a “palace revolution” (from the author – rebellion) in May 1923 and seizing control 
of the UVO. In a gesture of protest, Yevhen Konovalets left his position of the UVO 
commander in December 1923. Immediately after that, the UVO started negotiations 
with the UkrSSR government representative, Mykola Krestinskyi [25, 79]. 
An arrest of a courier, Olga Basarab, by the Polish police on 9 February 1924, 
was a severe blow for the R-R, which caused imprisonments for many UVO chiefs. A 
Kraiowyi leader, Andriy Melnyk, was one of them. The necessity for a quick response 
to the danger prompted Yevhen Konovalets to return to his position of the UVO leader 
on June 3, 1924 [26, 39–40]. His initial measure was a removal of the Communists 
from the organization [28, 37]. In 1925, Osyp Dumin was dismissed from the UVO 
[22, 46]. Although, the UVO intelligence network founded by “Sulyma” continued its 
development. 
The R-R was headed by the Central intelligence bureau and counterintelligence 
bureau at the UVO General Staff headquarters (from the author – an abbreviated name 
“Tserber” was used). Its chief (intelligence leader) was a member of the UVO Supreme 
Command. He received organizational instructions from the UVO leader. In addition 
to that, he reported to the leader directly. The intelligence leader received instructions 
of a professional nature from the chief of the UVO headquarters. 
The intelligence leader’s area of power included such responsibilities as to appoint 
and transfer the chiefs of the “ekspozytury”, the units (intelligence subdivision staff) of 
the Headquarters of the Intelligence Leadership (hereinafter – URR) and the chiefs of 
the Intelligence Bureau (hereinafter – RB). Their dismissal from the post was confirmed 
with the UVO Supreme Command. In addition to that, the intelligence leader was 
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informed in case of orders, aimed at relevant R-R departments, which were issued by 
the Supreme Command, the Chief of Staff, the circuit and county commands. When the 
need for clerks and couriers had arisen, he recruited them to his staff. 
The executive body – URR, was under the intelligence leader’s jurisdiction and 
consisted of three divisions: 1) military intelligence, 2) political intelligence, 3) economic 
intelligence. Each of the three was headed by appointed chiefs. On the one hand, they 
were allowed to have a direct communication with the heads of the corps subdivisions 
of the intelligence “ekspozytury”. On the other hand, their contacts with any UVO 
institution were conducted only through the intelligence leader. One of the three URR 
divisions chiefs was in charge of the financial affairs. Moreover, special duties were 
assigned to the first division chief as he was a deputy intelligence leader, and headed the 
technical subdivision. 
The intelligence “web” (from the author – network) of the R-R covered the Second 
Polish Republic territory [7, 9]. According to its field of activity, it was divided into 
“garrison” (from the author – military) and territorial, and in quality of employees – 
into “active” and “passive” [9, 28–29]. 
In the R-R UVO instructions on the agents recruitment from April 1923 it was 
noted: “Only Ukrainians can be recruited to perform an active undercover work. The 
passive undercover work can be done by recruited officers, peasants, members of all 
kinds of hostile military organizations, and even civilians in prominent positions that 
can be somehow useful for the intelligence” [9, 126]. For instance, a staff member of the 
UVO military unit Pavlo Zablotskyi (“Gora”) recalled that, for gathering information 
about the army corps in Przemysl, not only the Ukrainian staff servicemen, but also 
the Poles, were involved into cooperation. For a monetary reward they photographed 
mobilization plans, secret orders of the Ministry of Defense, the Przemysl Arsenal 
documentation [3, 98]. The UVO intelligence agents in Krakow, headed by Dmytro 
Voloshchak (“Tsygunda”), had been taking certain secret documents from the Polish 
military headquarters [6, 8].
Given the preparations for an armed uprising, the main focus was on the development 
of an intelligence network among Ukrainians who had been called up to the Polish 
Army [24, 117–124]. Their task was to collect data on the military units’ deployment, 
their quantity, armaments, supply system, moral and political status etc. What is more, 
the tasks of the UVO intelligence agents included “spreading the dissatisfaction, first of 
all, among Ukrainian soldiers of the Polish army, and then among Belarusians, Germans, 
Lithuanians, Jews, as well as among the Poles themselves”. They had envisaged that the 
“combat groups” were created in the environment of the Ukrainian soldiers and senior 
officers of the Polish Army, which would prepare the workforce for the future army of 
the Unified Ukrainian State [9, 74]. 
The military “garrison” network, which was divided into corps of “ekspozytury”, 
divisional, regimental and battalion intelligence “stanytsi”, was responsible for that type 
of the UVO intelligence activities. 
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The intelligence leader appointed a chief of the corps intelligence “ekspozytura”, 
whom he issued orders and directives. Additionally, the chief of the corps intelligence 
“ekspozytury” collaborated with the head of a relevant UVO institution. His deputy 
was in charge of making a connection with the divisional intelligence “stanytsi”. Three 
subdivisions of the corps “ekspozytura” (military, economic and political) formed the 
Intelligence Corps Apartment. The administrators headed each of them and had a 
required number of couriers in their subordination, whose appointment was confirmed 
by the intelligence leader. 
The chief of the divisional intelligence “stanytsia” was appointed by the head of 
the corps intelligence “ekspozytura”. His duties included verification, making additions 
and generalizations of the intelligence reports which arrived from the regimental and 
battalion intelligence “stanytsi”. In addition to collecting information in their military 
units, they provided data on all of the important events at the settlement place of their 
intelligence “stanytsia”. 
The battalion intelligence “stanytsi” included “sotenni” (commanders of a 
100 soldiers) intelligence officers and “chetovi” (junior officers) informants who formed 
“intelligence stations”. At least two of the stations were supposed to function in every 
sotnia (100 soldiers unit) [9, 31–33]. The R-R instruction from January 20, 1924 gives an 
idea of the information gathering tendencies about aviation and armored vehicles. The 
first instruction block recommended to focus on such directions: 1) state and amount 
of aviational materials, 2) quantity of planes and their type, load-bearing capacity, 
3) location base, 4) places of maintenance and spare parts production, 5) aviation 
schools. The second block had such directions as: 1) unit name of armored vehicles, 
2) quantity of vehicles, 3) their engine power, 4) armor toughness [9, 100–102].
On December 15, 1923, an instruction for R-R was issued at the Kraiowa Military 
Organization (hereinafter – KVO). It contained a sample for writing reports. Each of 
the reports should have had those points: 1) writing date, 2) a person who provided the 
information (age, rank), 3) a unit the person belonged, 4) the military units located in the 
reported area, 5) those units structure, 6) the military names, 7) armament and technical 
support, 8) staffs accommodations, 9) soldiers equipment, 10) stocks of ammunition, 
weapons and other military objects, 11) changes in command, 12) officers personal 
data, 13) the mood among the servicemen, 14) national structure, 15) contradictions 
between the soldiers, 16) the subdivisions movements in the area, 17) reforms, 
18) provision of food and uniforms, 19) to indicate whether or not the submission 
was directly witnessed by the informant or mentioned from a third person, 20) try to 
accurately report military orders and service instructions, 21) to find out mobilization 
and training plans, 22) dispositions, 23) the rail and other kinds of transport which 
passes through the area [11, 125]. 
For instance, in the summer of 1925 a report was received by the R-R UVO 
stating on the Polish cavalry training maneuvers in the Brody – Dubno area, and on 
December 22, 1925 they obtained several intelligence reports on defensive fortifications 
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and new railway junctions in Warsaw, Poznan and Torun [19, 77]. The reports had 
15 pictures of the mentioned strategic objects attached [19, 193]. 
Whenever it was possible, the military intelligence activities were carried out also 
in the Soviet Union and Romanian armies. However, the Polish Army always remained 
their priority [11, 125]. The “UVO Military Code” assigned an important role to the 
intelligence work. In particular, the Code had such sections: “Pidsluh (eavesdropping) 
and secret”, “Intelligence” and “Patrol in the intelligence” [29, 1–25].
Along with the military intelligence direction, the UVO also paid not less amount 
of the attention to the territorial units’ development. In addition to Galicia, Volyn, 
Polissya, Kholmshchyna and Pidlashchia, the UVO intelligence network had gradually 
“launched its tentacles deeply into the indigenous Polish territory” [20, 92]. 
Its structure was divided into regional “ekspozytury”, circuit and county intelligence 
“stanytsi”. The chief of the regional “ekspozytury” received orders from the intelligence 
leader, and also in his current work he collaborated with the UVO regional team. The 
three subdivisions with their chiefs (military, political and economic) were subordinated 
to him uniting into the Intelligence Apartment [9, 30]. 
The UVO Field Headquarters structure (from the author – the name ekspozytura 
was also used) in Lviv provides more detailed understanding of the R-R territorial 
network structure. It consisted of: 1) department chief (was in charge of all activities), 
2) deputy (was responsible for political intelligence), 3) “protokoliant” (was engaged 
in correspondence encryption and decryption, replacing codes and secret clerical 
work) [11, 127–128]. According to “The book of ciphers for the use of the U.V.O. 
Intelligence Command” from January 14, 1925, the agents were assumed to utilize 
practices of a secret double-key encryption and an encryption table for their 
correspondence [10, 65–66]. A courier department, which acted separately from the 
intelligence, was a system of communication for the UVO R-R regional “ekspozytura”. 
The department acted strictly vertically and all the horizontal bindings between the 
intelligence centers were regarded as undesirable [3, 98].
The circuit and county UVO intelligence departments duplicated the “ekspozytura” 
by its staff of employees. Their duties also included counter-intelligence work. For 
example, the intelligence department of the Dolynska county UVO team headed by 
V. Matsevych was engaged in detecting traitors in the underground network [21, 169].
“The eyes and ears of the organization” were “district agents” and “local zviduny” 
(intelligence agents). The recommendation was to recruit those agents from the trusted 
members of the UVO who were ready to decisive actions. They disguised the fact of 
their intelligence work from the other UVO participants and identified potential hostile 
agents who could be provocateurs [11, 129]. In the document “What is required from 
the R.R employee”, the requirements for an agents were as follows: “self-dedication, 
courage, interest in the subject and professionalism”. It was noted that the object should 
be studied in detail which would not only helped the agent, but also increased the 
reports quality [8, 114].
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While intelligence officers recruitment process, special attention was focused on 
the national minorities of  the Second Polish Republic. First of all, they concentrated 
on the Belarusians, as well as Lithuanians and Germans. Thus, in the summer of 1924, 
Shenkler (“Pelican”), a German student, entered the German nationalist organization 
in Semyhorod territories (from the author – Transylvania, Romania) following his task 
from the R-R UVO [18, 193]. 
The “appropriate informers of the intelligence command” operated in parallel with 
them. It was forbidden to engage youth and students into the intelligence activities. 
Alternatively, the R-R instructions from December 30, 1923 recommended the 
involvement of disabled people and the other individuals who were not subjects of 
mobilization. When several agents acted in one settlement, they elected their chief, who 
looked after their “meeting apartment” [9, 98–99]. 
Individuals of other nationalities who provided R-R with information for 
monetary rewards were called agents and were not a category included into the UVO 
network [9, 34]. 
The Central Intelligence Bureau of the UVO (hereinafter – TsRB) operated in the 
western countries which were the neighbours of Poland. Its chief was appointed by the 
intelligence leader in agreement with the UVO leader of the concerned country. The 
TsRB consisted of such divisions: 
1) Organizational (processed the intelligence material for the UVO institutions, 
analysed the questionnaires, studied and synthesised the collected data); 
2) “Evidentsii” (information) and statistics (received intelligence reports, 
deciphered them, copied, translated and performed statistical analysis); 
3) Administrative (arranged all the technical cases of record keeping, selected and 
kept all the intelligence materials, as well as educational literature on the intelligence 
and counterintelligence activities) [9, 1]. 
Intelligence Bureaus (hereinafter – RB) were created under an order of the 
intelligence leader. Each of them was controlled by a chief who was subject to the 
intelligence leader and the corresponding head of the TsRB. Some RB specialized in 
intelligence work in foreign armies. One of the chiefs of the TsRB departments was 
involved in financing them [9, 35–37]. 
The clerical and office work in RB was done by the 1 department. Its scope of 
activities also included correspondence with the other UVO subdivisions. All the 
intelligence materials collected by the RB were thoroughly analyzed, arranged and 
numbered. Their correspondence was split into the one which belonged to them 
(outcoming documentation) and someone else’s (incoming documentation). The 
reports were divided into their own (sent by the RB), regional (received from the RR) 
and others (from intelligence agencies or individuals who were not included in the 
UVO). Excerpts from the press were also divided into native (from the UVO, as well 
as the other Ukrainian institutions) and foreign (not written in Ukrainian). All the 
received newspapers, magazines and books were included in an “evidentsiina” (records 
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or evidence) book with their sources indication. The public and secret orders of the 
enemy armies were unnumbered and stored separately [9, 15–17]. 
It is known that the 1 department (of the clerical work) of the TsRB made excerpts 
from the Soviet newspapers: 1) “Izvestia” (Moscow), 2) “Pravda” (Moscow), 3) “Economic 
life” (Moscow), 4) “Visti” (Kharkiv), 5) “Bilshovyk” (Kyiv), 6) “Red Army” (Kyiv). They 
also used the newspapers of Russian emigration: 1) “Rul” (Berlin), 2) “Dny” (Berlin), 
3) “Latest News” (Paris), 4) “Za Svobodu!” (Warsaw). From the Warsaw press they 
took: 1) “Rzeczpospolita”, 2) “Polska Zbrojna”, 3) “Robotnik”, 4) “Kurier Warszawski”, 
5) “Kurier Poranny”, 6) “Przegląd Wieczorny”, 7) “Kurier Polski”, 8) “Żołnierz Polski”, 
9) “Gazeta Warszawska”, 10) “Nasz Przegląd”. From the other Polish cities newspapers 
there were: 1) “Kurier Lwowski” (Lviv), 2) “Kurier Poznański” (Poznań), 3) “Słowo” 
(Vilnius), 4) “Dziennik Wileński” (Vilnius). From the free city of Danzig (Gdańsk): 
1) “Gazeta Gdańska”, 2) “Baltische Presse” [18, 215].
The development of the TsRB network abroad occurred at a rapid rate. As of 
August 27, 1924, the RB operated in Germany with a center in Königsberg. Its affiliates 
were located in Berlin, Danzig and Breslau. In the nearest future they planned to create 
the RB of Lithuania in Kaunas, and the RB of the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary 
were put into perspective [9, 108]. 
Lithuania, which had territorial claims to Poland, had a special position among 
the states friendly to the UVO. It was the very country that a close cooperation was 
established. On March 10, 1925, the R-R UVO signed an agreement with the Union 
of Lithuanian Shooters in Kaunas (in Lithuanian – Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga). They 
assumed that at the “shooters” headquarters the R-R UVO representative had a position 
of a senior intelligence officer. He got access to information about the Polish and Soviet 
Armies. In turn, the R-R UVO representative periodically handed the intelligence 
reports about the Polish Army to the “shooters”. In addition, the Union of Lithuanian 
Shooters undertook to provide the R-R with a monthly assistance in amount of 
200 dollars [15, 93–94]. The RB UVO “Baltyka” was stationed in Kaunas and included 
15 people, headed by a regional intelligence chief of the Kraiowa Team, Ivan Reviuk 
(“Bratovich”), who used the passport for the surname of Jonas Bratvichus [27, 346]. 
Furthermore, the Lithuanian diplomatic passport was used by Yevhen Konovalets and 
the combat referent officer Omelian Senyk (“Grabovskyi”) [23, 59–60]. Since 1927, a 
monthly UVO magazine called “Surma” was published in Kaunas [5, 323]. 
The R-R UVO had also provided a wide range of assistance to the Lithuanians. 
Thus, in December 1925, the RB in Danzig helped to transfer two submarines, which 
were purchased in Germany, to Klaipeda [23, 59–60]. Moreover, in 1926 they informed 
their allies in Kaunas about secret plans of Polish aggression against Lithuania [27, 346].
The fundings of the R-R UVO were received from different sources. As of 
October 20, 1925, the monthly R-R budget was 2.300 of the German marks. 750 of 
the marks went to finance the TsRB abroad and 1.500 was given to activities in the 
“Krai” (in Western Ukraine). From the latter mentioned sum, the 1.100 of marks were 
provided for the work of the “ekspozytury” chiefs and 400 – for various business trips. 
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For the next year the R-R budget was planned to be increased significantly. Their foreign 
expenditures should had been about 1.100 marks and the expenses for the activities of 
“Kraiowyi apparatus” – 2.750 marks. In addition, a contingency fund of 5.000 marks 
was introduced to help covering the expenses from purchasing secret documents, maps 
and photographs by particular “ekspozytury” [17, 28].
A huge amount of attention was paid by the R-R to their staff training. According 
to the R-R UVO document from July 14, 1924, 20 intelligent men were scheduled to be 
selected in the “Krai” (Galicia, Volyn, Polissya, Kholmshchyna and Pidlashchia) to take 
the 2-month “Lower Course”. After their graduation from the course they joined the 
Polish Army. A year later, 10 of the “Lower Course” graduates were selected to complete 
the “Higher Course”. It had been planned that all of them shortly acquired senior officers’ 
degrees in the Polish Army. There was also a separate intelligence training facility for 
women [9, 110–111].
In June 1925, the positions exchange was carried out for the period up to 
the beginning of January 1926, in order to conduct a comprehensive training of 
management personnel. The chief of the RB in Kaunas was transferred to the R-R 
“ekspozytura” in Grodno, the chief of the RB in Königsberg – to the “ekspozytura” 
in Warsaw, the RB chief in Danzig – to the “ekspozytura” in Torun, the RB chief in 
Frankfurt – to the “ekspozytura” in Poznan, the RB chief in Breslau – to the “ekspozytura” 
in Krakow [18, 89]. 
Occasionally, the methods of conducting agitation, geography, photography, 
etc were taught along with the intelligence subjects. During the summer of 1925 in 
Danzig the “Intelligence-agitational course” was taught for the R-R employees during 
two months. The number of students did not exceed 25 people. They were selected 
according to their age from 18 to 35 and places of origin from all the Galicia districts 
and also Volyn, Kholmshchyna and Pidlashchia. Each course subject had such amount 
of studying hours: 1) History of intelligence, its division, tasks and values (6 hours); 
2) Development of the intelligence apparatus and communications technology (6 hours); 
3) What is propaganda and how to perform it (10 hours); 4) Ciphers and chemical 
inks (10 hours); 5) The UVO tasks (10 hours); 6) How to conduct counter-intelligence 
(15 hours); 7) Basics of telegraph, telephone and radio (10 hours); 8) Telephone 
surveillance and espionage on a telegraph (20 hours); 9) Photography and its use 
in intelligence (40 hours); 10) Basic intelligence knowledge on infantry (6 hours), 
artillery (6 hours), cavalry (6 hours), aviation (6 hours); 11) Military affairs (6 hours); 
12) Mobilization and its sabotage (6 hours); 13) Important military facilities (10 hours); 
14) Military maps comprehension (10 hours); 15) Geography of Poland (10 hours); 
16) Polish Army (70 hours); 17) Intelligence in the Bolshevik and Romanian Armies 
(10 hours). In total, the course had 277 training hours (5 hours per day, without any 
weekends and holidays) [11, 95–98].
The training of the R-R UVO leaders took place during the period of 
September 23–25, 1925. The R-R chiefs of the Kraiowi ekspozytury from Lviv, Ternopil, 
Stanislav, Przemysl, Krakow and Warsaw, as well as Drohobych circuit intelligence 
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stanytsia participated in the training. A commander of Poznan ekspozytura was arrested 
by the Polish police, thus he was not able to attend it. All of the chiefs were given lectures 
on encryption. After that everyone received some personal instructions [16, 77]. 
The intelligence network of the Western Ukrainian Revolutionary Organization 
(hereinafter – ZUNRO) operated independently from the R-R UVO. Osyp Dumin created 
it on May 14, 1926, after a conflict with Yevhen Konovalets. The ZUNRO network had 
its cells in Galicia (Lviv, Stanislav, Drohobych, Dolyna, Zhovkva, Przemysl), Pokuttia 
(Kolomyia, Sniatyn) and Volyn (Kremenets, Rivne). It is known that the activities of 
their county teams, guided by the ZUNRO Kraiowa Team in Lviv, were led in Przemysl, 
Zhovkva and Drohobych [26, 468]. 
The network of the Dumin’s organization abroad was built on a principle of secret 
two-stage “simka” (seven people unit). At the first stage, the “comrades” elected three of 
them to be a head, a treasurer and a secretary. Each of the first stage members headed the 
“simka” of the second stage. The ZUNRO plan was to build a network in all major cities 
of the Eastern Galicia, to spread their influence on Volyn, Polissia and Transcarpathia, 
and even to create their centers in the USA and Canada. Nevertheless, they actually 
succeeded in their plan execution only in Germany [13, 56]. 
The main ZUNRO task was the collection of intelligence data and its transmission 
to Sadovsky, who was a secretary of the Soviet Consulate in Lviv [26, 468]. Osyp Dumin 
received a funding for those activities. For instance, he was paid 350 dollars for obtaining 
secret mobilization documents of the Polish Army [14, 110].
During that period of time, the ZUNRO and UVO opposed each other with the 
means of propaganda. Thus, on July 10, 1926, an appeal on the “Ukrainian Revolutionary” 
newspaper was published. It stated: “The Organization leadership should be very 
careful to reflect false libels, and this is because the editors of those libels – first of all, 
Dumin – as a former member of the Organization, and he knows many members, as he 
has shown the last time, he may go for another provocation” [12, 90]. 
The Polish police struck at the ZUNRO during the period of 1927–1928. At that 
very time about 20 of its supporters were arrested in Sniatyn and Kolomyia territories 
(two sons of the writer Vasyl Stefanyk were among them). The ZUNRO permanently 
ceased its activity in 1929 [26, 39–40]. 
In January 1926, Yulian Golovinskyi (“Hetman”) was appointed to the position 
of the UVO Kraiowyi leader, he directed the major efforts to intensify combat activity 
of committing acts of terrorism, attacks on banking and postal institutions, and 
etc. The movable “flying brigades” were created specifically for performing “eksy” 
(form the author – acts of expropriation), which were the UVO source of getting 
funds [26, 30–32].
According to Golovinskyi, the intelligence data was more necessary for the “general 
staffs of the foreign armies” than for the Ukrainian liberation movement [1, 144–145]. 
The intelligence network development caused significant losses for the underground, 
and cooperation with the foreign security services undermined their credibility among 
the population. By following his convictions, Golovinskyi demanded from Yevhen 
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Konovalets a complete liquidation of the R-R and threatened that, otherwise, he would 
leave his position [3, 99].
In conclusion, the structure of the UVO intelligence subdivision was based on 
the territorial principle. It consisted of three groups – military, territorial and foreign. 
The military network was divided into corps “ekspozytury”, divisional, regimental 
and battalion intelligence “stanytsi”. The territorial network consisted of the regional 
“ekspozytury”, circuit and county intelligence “stanytsi”. The foreign network was 
composed of the Intelligence bureaus guided by the Central intelligence bureau. 
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ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЙ 
РЕФЕРЕНТУРЫ УВО (1921–1929 гг.)
В статье установлено, что структура разведывательной референтуры 
УВО состояла из трех групп: военной, территориальной и зарубежной. Воен-
ная сеть состояла из корпусных «экспозитур», а также дивизионных, полковых 
и батальонных «разведывательных станиц». Территориальная – разделялась 
на областные «экспозитуры», окружные и уездные «разведывательные ста-
ницы». Зарубежная – состояла из Разведывательных бюро, которые подчинялись 
Центральному разведывательному бюро.
Ключевые слова: разведка, УВО, территориальная сеть, агентура, Польша, 
Литва, Германия.
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ACTIVITY OF THE UVO INTELLIGENCE SUBDIVISION
(1921–1929)
The article reviews a topical and poorly researched development stage of the special 
services of the Ukrainian liberation movement which is an activity of an intelligence 
subdivision of the Ukrainian Military Organization.
Its origin and formation was based on the combat experience gained by the soldiers of 
the Ukrainian Galician Army. A former Sich Riflemen senior officer, Osyp Dumin, played 
an important role in its development. It was under his command that the intelligence 
subdivision acquired its full status. 
At the same time, Osyp Dumin’s role in the UVO development had also a different, 
negative influence. He had a pro-Soviet position and gathered his supporters. By relying 
on his followers, Osyp Dumin tried to eliminate Yevhen Konovalets from a position in the 
authority. Eventually, his manoeuvre caused a split in the UVO and formation of a West-
Ukrainian revolutionary organization that had its own intelligence network. 
УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ ВИЗВОЛЬНИЙ РУХ 
51
In spite of its internal strifes, a network of the UVO intelligence subdivision had 
been constantly evolving. Gradually, it covered not only Galicia, Volyn and Polissya, but 
also spread its activities over the entire territory of the Second Polish Republic. The UVO 
intelligence network was divided into three groups, by the types of its structure and tasks, – 
military, territorial and foreign. All of them were headed by the Central intelligence bureau. 
According to data collected by the Polish Army units, the UVO military intelligence 
network was divided into field corps “ekspozytury” (units), divisional, regimental and 
battalion intelligence “stanytsi” (villages). The servicemen of the Ukrainian descent were 
considered to be the most reliable force 
The territorial network of the UVO intelligence subdivision was divided into regional 
“ekspozytury”, circuit and county intelligence “stanytsi”. The following positions were 
presumed to be structural parts of the regional “ekspozytury”: 1) a department chief, 2) a 
deputy (responsible for political intelligence), 3) “protokoliant” (a protocol agent who was 
engaged in a secret clerical work). The circuit and county intelligence “stanytsi” resembled 
the regional “ekspozytura” by its staff organization.
The foreign departments of the UVO intelligence subdivision consisted of the 
Intelligence bureaus that were subordinated to the Central Intelligence bureau. The latter 
was composed of three sections: 1) organizational, 2) evidentsii (evidence) and statistics, 
3) administrative. The most influential UVO cells were in Kaunas, Berlin, Königsberg, 
Danzig and Wrocław. Lithuania had a special position among the UVO allies, due to the 
fact, that the UVO established a close cooperation with the state. The UVO intelligence 
provided the Lithuanians with information on the Polish military plans, a state of their 
army armament, and various training. Lithuania returned favour with providing the UVO 
with funds donations, making the documents for the underground members and support 
in their literature publication. 
The UVO intelligence forces were strongly concentrated on the training of their 
employees. They organized short-term courses for the higher and lower underground staff. 
They performed an exchange between their chief positions for the underground members 
to gain new experiences. Despite Osyp Dumin’s actions aimed at the rupture and Yulian 
Golovinskyi hostile attitude towards development of the UVO intelligence subdivision, 
the UVO special services continued its existence. Subsequently, it became the basis for the 
OUN intelligence development.
Keywords: intelligence, UVO, territorial network, agents, Polish, Lithuania, 
Germany. 
